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WORKERS' COMPENSATION
Daniel E. Lynch*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article addresses recent developments in the law of workers'
compensation, as reflected in decisions of the Supreme Court of
Virginia and the Virginia Court of Appeals, and through new
legislation. Areas discussed include (1) injury by accident claims; (2)
occupational disease claims; (3) benefits and coverage under the
Workers' Compensation Act; and (4) 1999 legislative changes
affecting workers' compensation.
II. INJURY BY ACCIDENT CLAIMS
A. Arising Out of Employment
In Smithfield Packing Co. v. Carlton,1 the claimant was awarded
benefits by the Workers' Compensation Commission (the "Com-
mission") for an injury to his foot.2 While operating a tractor trailer
for his employer, the claimant made a wide right turn.' As he was
doing so, a motorcycle approached him from behind and to his right.4
The claimant stopped the tractor trailer to allow the motorcycle to
pass.' Once he was past the tractor trailer, the operator of the
motorcycle stopped in front of the truck, got off his motorcycle, and
approached the claimant.6 He reached in, grabbed the claimant's
arm, and pulled him.' The claimant "fell out of the truck on to the
ground."' The driver of the motorcycle was trying to kick him and
* Principal, Williams, Lynch & Whitt, P.C., Richmond, Virginia. B.B., 1984, James
Madison University; J.D., 1987, University of Richmond School of Law.
The author acknowledges the assistance of John T. Cornett, Jr., Associate, Williams,
Lynch & Whitt, P.C., with the preparation of this article.
1. 29 Va. App. 176, 510 S.E.2d 740 (Ct. App. 1999).
2. See id. at 179, 510 S.E.2d at 741.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id. at 179, 510 S.E.2d at 741-42.
8. Id.
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they "started tussling."9 As the claimant tried to get up, the truck
rolled over his foot, and the injury to his foot resulted. °
Awarding benefits to the claimant, the Commission determined
that:
[Tihe need to occupy part of two lanes to negotiate a turn in a tractor trailer
and the difficulty in seeing a small object such as a motorcycle on the right
side are all risks peculiar to the claimant's employment as a truck driver.
We also agree that the altercation was business related. It is clear [the
motorcycle driver] was angry because he was almost run over by a truck of
which the claimant was the driver. There is no evidence that [the motorcycle
driver] and the claimant knew each other or that the incident arose from
anything other than a potential collision between a motorcycle and the
tractor trailer that the claimant was driving for his employer."
On appeal to the Virginia Court of Appeals, the employer asserted
that the claimant failed to prove that his injury "arose out of' his
employment. 2 Affirming the Commission's award of benefits to the
claimant, the court of appeals reasoned that the motorcycle opera-
tor's
furious attack on [the] claimant was triggered by [the] claimant's "need to
occupy part of two lanes to negotiate a turn in a tractor trailer and the
difficulty in seeing a small object such as a motorcycle on the right side,"
impersonal circumstances directly attributable to the duties of his
employment and clearly satisfying the "arising out of' prong of
compensability. 3
The court noted that Virginia applies the "actual risk" test, which
"'requires that the employment subject the employee to the particu-
lar danger that brought about his or her injury.""4 The court further
stated that in order for a claimant to be awarded benefits as a result
of an assault, the claimant must establish "that the assault was
directed against him as an employee, or because of his employ-
ment."'-
9. Id. at 180, 510 S.E.2d at 742.
10. See id. at 179-80, 510 S.E.2d at 741-42.
11. Id. at 180, 510 S.E.2d at 742.
12. See id.
13. Id. at 181-82, 510 S.E.2d at 742-43.
14. Id. at 181, 510 S.E.2d at 742 (quoting Lipsey v. Case, 248 Va. 59, 61, 445 S.E.2d 105,
106 (1994)).
15. Id. at 181,510 S.E.2d at 742 (quoting Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Gough, 161 Va. 755,
760, 172 S.E. 264, 266 (1934)). The employer also contended that the claimant should have
been barred from recovery because his seatbelt was unfastened at the time of the injury in
violation of the employer's safety rules. See id. at 182,510 S.E.2d at 743. The court of appeals
agreed with the Commission's determination that even though the claimant willfully violated
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B. Exposure to Extreme Temperatures
In Southern Express v. Green,16 the claimant worked at a
convenience store, stacking beer and soft drinks in a refrigerated
room for a period of up to four hours, wearing only a short-sleeved
shirt with no gloves.1" The claimant was subsequently diagnosed
with chilblains" and superficial frostbite caused by long-term
exposure to cold temperature. 9 A Deputy Commissioner of the
Commission denied this claim, finding that the claimant's injury
resulted from "continuous exposure over a period of time."0 The full
Commission reversed the Deputy Commissioner's decision and
awarded benefits to the claimant.2 ' On appeal, a panel of the court
of appeals affirmed the award of benefits on the basis that "a
condition resulting from exposure to extreme temperatures may still
constitute an 'injury by accident."22 The Supreme Court of Virginia
awarded an appeal to the employer.'
Affirming the opinion of the court of appeals, the supreme court
agreed that the claimant proved an injury by accident.24 The
supreme court noted that the claimant's "chilblains first appeared
during the time that she spent in the cooler, thus at a particular
time and place and upon a particular occasion, and resulted in a
structural change in her body."25 The court further stated that the
claimant's chilblains resulted from a single exposure to cold
temperature on a definite occasion during the performance of a
specific piece of work.26 In conclusion, the court held that the
the employer's safety rule, the claimant was allowed to recover workers' compensation
benefits because the employer failed to prove that the violation caused the claimant's injury.
See id. at 182-83, 510 S.E.2d at 743.
16. 257 Va. 181, 509 S.E.2d 836 (1999).
17. See id. at 183-84, 509 S.E.2d at 837.
18. See id. at 185 n.3, 509 S.E.2d at 838 n.3 (Chilblains is described as "[a] form of cold
injury characterized by localized erythema and sometimes blistering. The affected area itches,
may be painful, and may progress to crusted ulcerations .... ") (citing TOBE'S CYCLOPEDIC
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 367 (17th ed. 1993)).
19. See Green, 257 Va. at 184-85, 509 S.E.2d at 838.
20. Id. at 185, 509 S.E.2d at 838.
21. See id.
22. Id. (quoting Southern Express v. Green, 26 Va. App. 439,445,495 S.E.2d 500,503 (Ct.
App. 1998)).
23. See id. at 183, 509 S.E.2d at 837.
.24. See id. at 188-89, 509 S.E.2d at 840-41 (citing Byrd v. Stenega Coke & Coal Co., 182
Va. 212, 28 S.E.2d 725 (1943) (holding that injuries caused by exposure to extreme
temperatures may constitute an "injury by accident" under the Workers' Compensation Act)).
25. Green, 257 Va. at 188-89, 509 S.E.2d at 840.
26. See id. at 189, 509 S.E.2d at 841.
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claimant established an identifiable incident, noting that the
claimant's medical condition "was not caused by repeated exposures
over a period of months or years."27 The supreme court disagreed
with the employer's assertion that the claimant's injury "resulted
from repetitive trauma, continuing physical stress, or a cumulative
event."
28
C. Compensable Consequence
The Virginia Court of Appeals addressed a matter of first
impression involving compensable consequences in the case of Allen
& Rocks, Inc. v. Briggs.29 In Briggs, the claimant sustained a
compensable injury to his lower back when he slipped on stairs in
the course of his employment. ° Over a year later, the claimant
developed severe pain in his lower leg.3 Dr. Murray Joiner, the
claimant's treating physiatrist, expressed the opinion that the
claimant's left knee pain was secondary to chronic gait deviations
caused by the claimant's failed back syndrome, which was compen-
sable. 2 At the employer's request, the claimant underwent an
independent medical evaluation.33 Dr. Daniel L. Hodges concluded
that the claimant suffered from failed back syndrome with secondary
mechanical pain in the right knee due to the claimant's "antalgic
gait from his low back."34 The employer and insurance carrier denied
the claim for benefits relative to the claimant's left knee.35 Following
a hearing on the record, the Commission found the claimant's left
knee injury "was a compensable consequence of his work-related
back injury.""
On appeal to the Virginia Court of Appeals, the employer argued
that the Commission erred in awarding benefits to the claimant for
his knee condition.37 The employer reasoned that the knee pain was
the result of cumulative trauma, which is not compensable under the
Workers' Compensation Act.38 Relying on the decision by the
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. 28 Va. App. 662, 508 S.E.2d 335 (Ct. App. 1998).
30. See id. at 665, 508 S.E.2d at 336.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 666, 508 S.E.2d at 336-37.
33. See id.
34. Id. at 667, 508 S.E.2d at 337.
35. See id.
36. Id.
37. See id.
38. See id.
[Vol. 33:1101
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Supreme Court of Virginia in Stenrich Group v. Jemmott,39 the
employer contended that the doctrine of compensable consequences
does not apply when there is a gradually incurred injury.0 The
employer argued that an employee may not recover for cumulative
trauma injuries "however labeled or however defined."4'
The court of appeals disagreed with the employer, however, and
affirmed the award of benefits by the Commission.42 The court held
that any subsequent injury to the claimant's knee that was a direct
and natural result of the primary back injury was also compensable
under the chain of causation rule.43 Further, the court noted that the
medical evidence established that the claimant's knee condition was
"secondary to and as a consequence of' his primary back injury."
The general rule in Virginia is that "[w]hen the primary injury is
shown to have arisen out of and in the course of employment, every
natural consequence that flows from the injury likewise arises out
of the employment, unless it is the result of an intervening cause
attributable to claimant's own intentional conduct." 5
D. Consequence of a Compensable Consequence
In Amoco Foam Products Co. v. Johnson,"6 the issue before the
Supreme Court of Virginia was whether a claimant may be awarded
benefits for an injury caused by a compensable consequence, or a
"consequence of a compensable consequence."' In July 1992, the
claimant sustained a compensable left ankle injury arising out of her
employment." Following medical treatment and surgery on the
ankle, the claimant fell at home in August 1994; her ankle gave way,
causing injury to her right knee.4 9 The August 1994 right knee injury
was found to be a compensable consequence of the July 1992
industrial accident.5" The claimant subsequently sustained a further
39. 251 Va. 186, 467 S.E.2d 795 (1996).
40. See Briggs, 28 Va. App. at 670, 508 S.E.2d at 338.
41. Id. (quoting Jemmott, 251 Va. at 199, 467 S.E.2d at 802).
42. See id. at 672, 508 S.E.2d at 339.
43. See id.
44. Id.
45. Id. (citing Food Distribs. v. Estate ofBall, 24 Va. App. 692, 697, 485 S.E.2d 155, 158
(Ct. App. 1997); Leadbetter v. Penkalski, 21 Va. App. 427, 432, 464 S.E.2d 554, 556-57 (Ct.
App. 1995); Imperial Trash Serv. v. Dotson, 18 Va. App. 600, 606-07,445 S.E.2d 716, 720 (Ct.
App. 1994)).
46. 257 Va. 29, 510 S.E.2d 443 (1999).
47. Id. at 32, 510 S.E.2d at 444.
48. See id. at 30-31,510 S.E.2d at 443.
49. See id. at 31,510 S.E.2d at 443.
50. See id.
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right knee injury in November 1995 when her right knee "gave out"
at home, causing her to fall."' Affirming the decision of the Commis-
sion, the Virginia Court of Appeals held that the claimant's Novem-
ber 1995 knee injury was compensable as a consequence of her 1994
knee injury, which was a compensable consequence of her 1992
ankle injury.
52
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the court of
appeals and denied the claim for benefits attributable to the
November 1995 right knee injury.53 The supreme court noted that
there was no causal connection between the incidents of employment
giving rise to the 1992 ankle injury and the knee injury in November
1995.4 The court stated that the "link of causation must directly
connect the original accidental injury with the additional injury for
which compensation is sought."55 Accordingly, the supreme court
held that the court of appeals erred in holding that the claimant's
1995 knee injury was a compensable consequence of her 1992 ankle
injury, as the 1995 injury did not arise out of the claimant's
employment.
56
III. OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE CLAIMS
A. Allergic Contact Dermatitis
In A New Leaf, Inc. v. Webb, 7 the Supreme Court of Virginia,
affirming the opinion of the Virginia Court of Appeals, held that the
claimant's allergic contact dermatitis was compensable as an
occupational disease under the Workers' Compensation Act.8 In
Webb, the claimant was employed as a florist where "[hier responsi-
bilities included daily handling, cutting and arranging of flowers."59
In March 1995, she noticed "blistered, splotchy areas on her right
index finger [and palm] ... similar in appearance to a poison ivy
rash."6" She was diagnosed with allergic contact dermatitis attribut-
51. See id.
52. See id. at 31, 510 S.E.2d at 443-44.
53. See id. at 31, 510 S.E.2d at 444.
54. See id. at 32-33, 510 S.E.2d at 444-45.
55. Id. at 33, 510 S.E.2d at 445.
56. See id.
57. 257 Va. 190, 511 S.E.2d 102 (1999).
58. See id. at 192, 511 S.E.2d at 102.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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able to her contact with two of the flowers with which she worked.6'
The claimant filed a claim for benefits, alleging that her allergic
contact dermatitis was a compensable occupational disease.62 The
full Commission affirmed the decision of the Deputy Commissioner,
finding the claim compensable.63 A panel of the Virginia Court of
Appeals affirmed the opinion of the Commission, finding that
"'[ciredible evidence supports the commission's factual finding that
claimant's allergic contact dermatitis was not caused by "cumulative
traumatic insults resulting from repetitive motion." The record
indicates that claimant's allergic contact dermatitis was not causally
linked to any repetitive motion that she performed at work.'6' The
court of appeals noted that "[a]llergic contact dermatitis is caused
by the reaction of an individual's immune system with a substance
... to which that individual has developed a hypersensitivity."' 5
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia, the employer relied
primarily on the supreme court's decisions in Stenrich Group v.
Jemmott66 and Merillat Industries, Inc. v. Parks67 to contend that the
claimant's contact dermatitis was not compensable. 6 The employer
argued that it was caused by repeated exposure to flowers and was
the result of cumulative trauma, which is not compensable. 69 The
court, however, distinguished Jemmott and Merillat by reasoning
that the medical evidence established that the claimant was allergic
to some of the flowers that she handled at work and that the contact
dermatitis was caused by her physical contact with the chemicals
contained in those flowers.7 0 The court stated that contact dermatitis
was a "reaction of the body's immune system to the substance to
which the person is sensitive.'"7 ' While "the sores and blisters
appeared on [the claimant's] hands after frequent handling of the
flowers ... there [was] no evidence .. .that her allergic contact
dermatitis resulted from cumulative trauma arising from repetitive
61. See id. at 193, 511 S.E.2d at 102-03.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 194, 511 S.E.2d at 103.
64. Id. (quoting A New Leaf, Inc. v. Webb, 26 Va. App. 460,468,495 S.E.2d 510,514 (Ct.
App. 1998).
65. Id. (quoting Webb, 26 Va. App. at 468, 495 S.E.2d at 514).
66. 251 Va. 186, 467 S.E.2d 795 (1996).
67. 246 Va. 429, 436 S.E.2d 600 (1993).
68. See Webb, 257 Va. at 195-97, 511 S.E.2d at 104-05.
69. See Webb, 257 Va. at 195-96, 511 S.E.2d at 104.
70. See id. at 197, 511 S.E.2d at 105.
71. Id. (quoting Cindy Hoogasian, Dermatitis Concerns Continue, FLORIST, March 1990,
at 77).
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motion." 2 Therefore, this case was distinguished from Jemmott,
where the court held that "job-related impairments resulting from
cumulative trauma caused by repetitive motion, however labeled or
however defined, are, as a matter of law, not compensable under the
. . . Act."73 In Webb, the court also concluded that the claimant's
allergic contact dermatitis qualified as a disease.74 Accordingly, the
supreme court affirmed the court of appeals decision awarding
benefits to the claimant.75
IV. BENEFITS AND COVERAGE UNDER THE WORKERS'
COMPENSATION ACT
A. Claimant's False Statement as to Felony Convictions in an
Employment Application
In Prince William County Service Authority v. Harper,76 the
claimant concealed felony convictions when she completed an
application for employment.77 The employment application contained
the following question: "Have you ever been convicted of a law
violation . . . ?"7' The claimant answered "no" to this question,
although she had pled guilty to the felonies of insurance fraud and
criminal conspiracy in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania just one
year earlier.79 To ensure the accuracy of the information in the
employment application, it also contained the following certification:
"I hereby certify that this application is a complete record and that
all entries given are true and accurate to the best of my
knowledge." °
The claimant sustained injuries to her left wrist and coccyx while
performing job related duties in June 1994." The parties executed
agreements providing for the payment of disability benefits for time
72. Id.
73. Jemmott, 251 Va. at 199, 467 S.E.2d at 802.
74. See Webb, 257 Va. at 197-98, 511 S.E.2d at 105. Finding that the claimant's contact
dermatitis was a disease rather than an injury, the court noted that the claimant's condition
was the result of a dermatological reaction with the chemicals in the flowers "which is distinct
from the wear and tear resulting from a repetitive motion." Id. at 198, 511 S.E.2d at 105.
75. See id.
76. 256 Va. 277, 504 S.E.2d 616 (1998).
77. See id.
78. Id. at 278, 504 S.E.2d at 616.
79. See id.
80. Id.
81. See id. at 278-79, 504 S.E.2d at 616.
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that the claimant missed from work.82 In February 1995, the
claimant filed an application seeking additional disability wage
benefits because of a change in her condition. 3 During the course of
that proceeding, the employer learned of the claimant's undisclosed
felony convictions.'
At a hearing before a Deputy Commissioner, the employer's
personnel director testified that the claimant would not have been
hired had she disclosed her felony convictions because of the nature
of the convictions and their proximity to her date of hire.85 While the
claimant resigned from her employment before the employer became
aware of her felony convictions, the personnel director further
testified that had the claimant been employed at the time that the
employer learned of her misrepresentations, her employment would
have been terminated. 6 The employer asserted at the hearing that
the claimant's false representations precluded the claimant from
receiving workers' compensation benefits.8 The Deputy Commis-
sioner rejected the employer's assertion and awarded benefits.88 This
decision was affirmed by the full Commission. 9 The employer
appealed the Commission's award of benefits to the Virginia Court
of Appeals, which affirmed the Commission's decision, finding that
the evidence failed to demonstrate that "'the misrepresentation, that
Harper had not committed a crime, was causally related to Harper's
injury.
" 90
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia, the employer
asserted that since the claimant obtained her employment through
fraud or material misrepresentation, she should be barred from
receiving workers' compensation benefits."' The employer argued
that there was no valid contract of hire and that she may not benefit
from her fraudulent conduct.9 The employer further asserted that
a causal relationship existed between the claimant's failure to
disclose her felony convictions and her injury because if she had
82. See id. at 279, 504 S.E.2d at 616.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id. at 279, 504 S.E.2d at 617.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. Id. (quoting Prince William County Serv. Auth. v. Harper, 25 Va. App. 166, 170, 487
S.E.2d 246, 248 (Ct. App. 1997)).
91. See id. at 280, 504 S.E.2d at 617.
92. See id.
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revealed her convictions in her job application, she would not have
been hired, and the employer/employee relationship would not have
existed. 9 3 Applying the principles set forth in Falls Church Construc-
tion Co. v. Laidler,94 the supreme court affirmed the decision of the
court of appeals and held that the claimant was not barred from
receiving workers' compensation benefits.95 The court held that the
employer "failed to adduce evidence which established a causal
relationship between her work-related injury and her misrepresenta-
tion of her criminal record."96 According to the court, the personnel
director's testimony that the employer would not have hired the
claimant had it been aware of her felony convictions was insufficient
to establish a causal relationship between the claimant's misrepre-
sentation of her felony convictions and her work-related injury.97
B. Claimant's Misrepresentation of Immigration Status and
Eligibility for Employment in the United States During the Hiring
Process
The issue in Granados v. Windson Development Corp.98 was
whether the Virginia Court of Appeals erred in denying workers'
compensation benefits to an illegal alien "because he misrepresented
his immigration status and eligibility for employment in the United
States."9 At the time Granados was hired, he was asked to provide
his Social Security card and one other form of identification, in
accordance with the requirements of the United States Department
of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service.'00 Granados
presented a Social Security card bearing his name and a card
purportedly issued by the Immigration and Naturalization Service
that contained his photograph and identified him as a resident
alien.'0 ' Granados also signed the required employment eligibility
93. See id.
94. 254 Va. 474,493 S.E.2d 521 (1997). in Laid/er, the supreme court held that where an
employee falsely represents information in an employment application, a later claim for
worker's compensation benefits is barred "if the employer proves that 1) the employee
intentionally made a material false representation; 2) the employer relied on that
representation; 3) the employer's reliance resulted in the consequent injury; and 4) there is
a causal relationship between the injury in question and the misrepresentation." Id. at 477-
78, 493 S.E.2d at 523.
95. See Harper, 256 Va. at 280, 504 S.E 2d at 617.
96. Id.
97. See id.
98. 257 Va. 103, 509 S.E.2d 290 (1999).
99. Id. at 105, 509 S.E.2d at 290.
100. See id. at 105, 509 S.E.2d at 290-91.
101. See id. at 105, 509 S.E.2d at 291.
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and verification form, attesting that he was a permanent resident
alien. 1
02
The evidence established that Granados was ineligible for lawful
employment in the United States on the date that he was hired and
on the date that he sustained his work-related injury. 0 3 At a hearing
before a Deputy Commissioner andin discovery, "Granados admitted
that he had never applied for a Social Security card or any other
kind of work permit, that he was not a permanent resident alien,
and that he was ineligible for employment in the United States."104
He did not dispute that the documents that he provided to the
employer were forged.0 5 A representative of Windson Development
Corporation ("Windson") testified that Windson did not hire
applicants who lacked proper documentation of their immigration
status, and that Granados would not have been hired if he had failed
to produce documents indicating his eligibility for employment.
10 6
The Deputy Commissioner denied the claim for benefits because the
claimant materially misrepresented his employment eligibility by
providing the false documentation and by signing the employment
eligibility verification form.'0 7 The full Commission affirmed the
opinion of the Deputy Commissioner, which was subsequently
affirmed by the Virginia Court of Appeals.0 8
On appeal the supreme court determined that the Commission,
as affirmed by the court of appeals, erred in ruling that Granados's
false representations barred his recovery of workers' compensation
benefits.' 9 The court stated that the employer"failed to demonstrate
the required causal relationship between Granados'[s] false
representation and his resulting injury.""0 The court also noted that
Granados's injury was "unrelated to the substance of his false
representations concerning his immigration status and [his]
eligibility for employment.""' The supreme court further deter-
mined, however, that Granados was not "in the service of Windson
under any contract of hire because, under the Immigration Reform
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. Id.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 105-06, 509 S.E.2d at 291.
107. See id. at 106, 509 S.E.2d at 291.
108. See id. (citing Granadas v. Windson Dev. Corp., 26 Va. App. 251,494 S.E.2d 162 (Ct.
App. 1997)).
109. See id. at 108, 508 S.E.2d at 292.
110. Id. at 108, 509 S.E.2d at 292.
111. Id.
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and Control Act of 1986, an illegal alien cannot be employed lawfully
in the United States.""2 The supreme court affirmed the opinion of
the court of appeals and denied benefits to Granados on the grounds
that Granados was ineligible to receive workers' compensation
benefits as an "employee" under the Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986 because his purported contract of hire was void
and unenforceable.1
3
C. Average Weekly Wage Calculations and the 'Substantially
Similar" Doctrine
In Mercy Tidewater Ambulance Service v. Carpenter,"4 the
claimant suffered a compensable injury to his back while working as
a paramedic, or emergency medical technician ("EMT") for Mercy
Tidewater." 5 The parties executed a Memorandum of Agreement
that awarded the claimant wage benefits based upon his earnings as
an EMT for the employer." 6 At the time of his industrial accident,
however, the claimant was also employed as an unlicensed clinician
at Children's Hospital of the King's Daughters ("Children's Hospi-
tal")." 7 At the time the claimant executed the Memorandum of
Agreement, he was not aware that his job at Children's Hospital
could be considered as similar employment in computing his average
weekly wage.118 Therefore, the claimant filed an application
requesting that the Commission retroactively modify his average
weekly wage to include his wages from Children's Hospital." 9
As an EMT for Mercy Tidewater, the claimant "provided ad-
vanced and basic life support care to patients being transported in
an ambulance." 20 The claimant described his job duties at the
hearing in this manner: "We worked accidents, heart attacks,
strokes .... We would start IV's, start oxygen therapy, [provide]
patient assessments. We would give medications .... We would
draw blood, we analyze like blood sugars, bandage wounds, gunshots
.*..".1' According to the claimant, his duties as an unlicensed
112. Id. at 108, 509 S.E.2d at 293 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (1994)).
113. See id. at 108-09, 509 S.E.2d at 293.
114. 29 Va. App. 218, 511 S.E.2d 418 (Ct. App. 1999).
115. See id. at 221, 511 S.E.2d at 419.
116. See id.
117. See id. at 222, 511 S.E.2d at 419-20.
118. See id. at 222, 511 S.E.2d at 420.
119. See id. at 222-23, 511 S.E.2d at 420.
120. Id. at 221, 511 S.E.2d at 419.
121. Id. at 222, 511 S.E.2d at 419.
[Vol. 33:1101
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clinician at Children's Hospital included the following: "weighing
patients; taking vital signs, including pulse, respiration and blood
pressure; drawing blood samples; starting IVs; administering
respiratory treatments; assisting with heart monitors; and perform-
ing nasal washings and urine catheterizations."122
Agreeing with the claimant and amending his average weekly
wage, the Commission found "substantial overlap in the specific
duties and skills required of both jobs. The claimant's primary
mission for both employers was emergency medical services."' 13 The
Commission further noted that the "claimant provided a valid
explanation for his delay in seeking a modification of the award and
[the] employer failed to show any prejudice.""2 Mercy Tidewater
appealed the Commission's decision amending the claimant's
average weekly wage to the Virginia Court of Appeals.
On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the decision of the
Commission, noting that "Virginia follows the majority rule that
when an employee is injured on one job while in concurrent employ-
ment, the average weekly wage compensated is based on the
combined earnings of both jobs if, but only if, the employments are
related or similar.''" The court pointed out that the term "similar"
in this respect may relate to the similarity of "(1) the work, (2) the
industry in which the work is performed, or (3) the degree of hazard
to which the employee is exposed."126 The court held that "credible
evidence supports the commission's finding that [the] claimant's
employment at Children's Hospital was substantially similar to his
employment at Mercy Tidewater."12 7 The court's decision reiterated
the Commission's findings that the claimant's jobs with both
employers substantially overlapped in the specific duties and skills,
and that the claimant's primary mission for both employers was
emergency care services."2
122. Id. at 222,511 S.E.2d at 420.
123. Id. at 223,511 S.E.2d at 420.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 224,511 S.E.2d at 421 (quoting First Virginia Banks, Inc. v. McNeil, 8 Va. App.
342, 343, 381 S.E.2d 357, 358 (Ct. App. 1989)).
126. Id. at 224, 511 S.E.2d at 421 (citing 5 ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKmEN'S
COMPENSATION § 60.31 (1997)).
127. Id.
128. See id. at 225, 511 S.E.2d at 421. The court ofappeals also held that from a procedural
standpoint, the Commission correctly modified the claimant's average weekly wage, as there
was a mutual mistake of fact as to the claimant's average weekly wage. See id. at 226-27,511
S.E.2d at 422. The Commission held that the claimant sufficiently explained his delay in
requesting a modification, as the claimant testified that at the time he executed the
Memorandum of Agreement, he was not aware that his job at Children's Hospital could be
11131999]
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D. Average Weekly Wage Calculations Where Employee's Two
Different Jobs are Performed for the Same Employer
An interesting twist to the "substantially similar" doctrine was
presented in Dinwiddie County School Board v. Cole.'29 In that case,
Cole held two jobs with the Dinwiddie County School Board (the
"School Board"): one job as a bus driver and a second job as a
teacher's aide.' She had separate contracts for each job, and she
was paid from separate budgets in different departments.' 3 ' Cole
sustained a compensable injury to her shoulder while working as a
teacher's aide."'3 Although the injury prevented her from driving her
school bus, a Deputy Commissioner found that Cole's two positions
were dissimilar; therefore, the wages from the two jobs were not to
be combined in calculating the claimant's average weekly wage. 33
The Commission "agreed that the jobs were dissimilar but calculated
Cole's average weekly wage by combining income from both posi-
tions."3 4 In addition, she was awarded temporary partial disability
wage benefits for lost earnings.'35 The School Board appealed this
opinion.
3 6
The Virginia Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
Commission, holding that Cole's earnings from both jobs were to be
combined in determining the average weekly wage. 37 The court
reasoned that the "substantially similar" doctrine, which prevents
combining salaries from two separate jobs if the jobs are dissimilar,
"is not present when the two jobs are performed for the same
employer. " 138 Citing to the Commission's decision with approval, the
court of appeals said the following:
considered as similar employment for the purposes of calculating his average weekly wage.
See id. Also, the employer was unaware of the claimant's job with Children's Hospital. See id.
The court of appeals also vacated the Commission's award of permanent partial disability
benefits, holding that the claimant failed to prove he had reached maximum medical
improvement. See id. at 227-28, 511 S.E.2d at 422-23.
129. 28 Va. App. 462, 506 S.E.2d 36 (Ct. App. 1998).
130. See id. at 463, 506 S.E.2d at 36.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. Id. at 463-64, 506 S.E.2d at 36-37.
135. See id.
136. See id. at 464, 506 S.E.2d at 37.
137. See id.
138. Id. at 465, 506 S.E.2d at 37.
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The rationale for the approach [combining wages under the "substantially
similar" doctrine] is to prevent the costs of injury being out of proportion to
the industry's payroll or risks. If an employee works for only one employer,
the burden is not out of proportion to the employer's payroll or the industry's
risks. The single employer is not being forced to assume responsibility for the
wages paid by some other employer or the risks of some other industry.
Combining a claimant's wages paid by a single employer for two jobs
performed is fair to the single employer because that employer had already
assumed the liability risk.139
Accordingly, the court in Cole affirmed the decision of the Commis-
sion, finding no reason to disturb the Commission's award. 4 °
E. Claimant's Cure of an Unjustified Refusal of Medical Care
Fairfax County School Board v. Rose141 concerned the effective-
ness of a "verbal cure' in the context of an unjustified refusal of
medical treatment," which was a matter of first impression in
Virginia.'42 In Rose, the claimant sustained a compensable injury
through an accident to her back in March 1991.'4 Dr. James W.
Preuss, the claimant's treating physician, and several other
physicians recommended that the claimant undergo back surgery to
repair two herniated lumbar discs.' The claimant refused to have
the recommended surgery.'45 The claimant's disability wage benefits
were suspended by the Commission as of November 7, 1993, on the
grounds that the claimant unjustifiably refused the recommended
back surgery.146
In July 1994, the claimant attempted suicide and was hospital-
ized and treated for depression. 47 She also suffered from agorapho-
bia, which restricted her ability to go out in public. 148 The claimant
received treatment for these conditions between 1994 and 1996.149
In November 1995, the claimant filed an application for a hearing,
seeking the reinstatement of wage benefits commencing November
6, 1995, on the basis that she was willing to submit to the surgery by
139. Id. at 464, 506 S.E.2d at 37.
140. See id. at 465, 506 S.E.2d at 37.
141. 29 Va. App. 32, 509 S.E.2d 525 (Ct. App. 1999).
142. Id. at 37, 509 S.E.2d at 527.
143. See id at 34, 509 S.E.2d at 526.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See Ud at 35, 509 S.E.2d at 526.
148. See id.
149. See id.
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Dr. Preuss."5 ° Claimant's counsel notified the employer's counsel by
a letter that stated "Ms. Rose is now willing to undergo the lumbar
surgery proposed by Dr. Preuss. Please contact me regarding the
scheduling of an appointment with Dr. Preuss."'5 ' The claimant met
with Dr. Preuss in February 1996 and stated her willingness to have
the surgery. 15 Dr. Preuss subsequently noted that he discussed
surgery with the claimant in February 1996, "but that he did not
recommend [the] surgery at that time because of her stable condi-
tion." 15 3 Dr. Preuss testified in a deposition that "in any case where
the patient's neurological examination is stable and the patient is
willing to tolerate the level of pain and incapacity, he would not
recommend surgery and he would regard it as an elective proce-
dure."'54 Dr. Preuss acknowledged "that if she was willing to undergo
[the] surgery, her symptoms would improve."'55 Following a hearing,
a Deputy Commissioner determined that the claimant's refusal of
medical treatment was effectively cured as of November 6, 1995.156
The full Commission affirmed the decision of the Deputy Commis-
sioner. 
157
Following a decision by a divided panel of the court of appeals, the
Virginia Court of Appeals addressed in a rehearing en banc whether
the claimant's November 6, 1995 letter informing the employer of
her willingness to undergo the previously refused surgery effectively
cured her prior unjustified refusal of medical treatment.5 8 The court
held that in order for a verbal cure of an unjustified refusal of
medical treatment to be effective, it must be made in good faith,
which must be demonstrated through "an affirmative action or a
showing of circumstances mitigating the failure to act." 59 The court
held that the claimant's letter, combined with the mitigating factors
of the claimant's mental conditions of depression and agoraphobia
(which explained any delay in contacting Dr. Preuss), cured her
unjustified refusal of medical treatment.60 The court noted that the
[c]laimant's psychological condition and her statements to her
150. See id.
151. Id.
152. See id.
153. Id. at 35, 509 S.E.2d at 526-27.
154. Id. at 35, 509 S.E.2d at 527.
155. Id. at 35-36, 509 S.E.2d at 527.
156. See id. at 36, 509 S.E.2d at 527.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. Id. at 38, 509 S.E.2d at 528.
160. See id. at 38-39, 509 S.E.2d at 528.
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treating physician, that she was willing to submit to surgery if it
was still recommended, were affirmative actions which reinforced
that her November 6, 1995 statement was made in good faith."''
Accordingly, the court of appeals affirmed the decision of the
Commission and held that the claimant timely and effectively cured
her prior refusal of medical treatment."6 2
V. 1999 LEGISLATIVE CHANGES AFFECTING WORKERS'
COMPENSATION
Virginia Code section 65.2-402 was amended by several bills that
were passed by the General Assembly in its 1999 Session. The
presumption as to death or disability from hypertension or heart
disease was extended for work-related death or disability to include
Virginia Marine Patrol officers. 6 3 This statute was further amended
to add game wardens who are "full-time sworn members of the
enforcement division of the Department of Game and Inland
Fisheries" and Capitol Police Officers to the category of employees
entitled to the presumptions of Virginia Code section 65.2-402."
Additionally, Virginia Code section 65.2-402 was amended to provide
that leukemia and various other cancers, which are "caused by a
documented contact with a toxic substance" and which cause death
or total or partial disability of a volunteer or salaried firefighter or
hazardous materials officer, with twelve years of continuous service
and while in the line of duty, are "presumed to be an occupational
disease."165
The General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 65.2-604
to require that all health care providers attending an injured
employee furnish, upon request, a copy of any medical report to the
injured employee, the employer, or the insurer, or any of their
161. Id at 39,509 S.E.2d at 528.
162. See id. Judge Coleman, joined by Judges Bray and Lemons, dissented, stating.
the record is clear, in my opinion, that in order to cure her unjustified refusal of
medical treatment she must be willing to have disc surgery, and Rose did not and
does not intend to have the surgery.... I would reverse the commission's finding
and hold that no credible evidence proves that Rose's "verbal cure" was in good
faith; to the contrary, the evidence proves that she had no intention to accept the
medical treatment.
Id. at 42-43, 509 S.E.2d at 530 (Coleman, J., dissenting).
163. See VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-402(B) (Curn. Supp. 1999).
164. Id.
165. Id. § 65.2-402(C) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
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representatives.'66 Prior to this amendment, this requirement was
imposed only on physicians.'
Virginia Code section 65.2-524 now allows the Commission to
waive the penalty imposed when benefits are not paid within two
weeks after they become due, if:
[T]he Commission finds that any required payment has been made as
promptly as practicable and (i) there is good cause outside the control of the
employer for the delay or (ii) in the case of a self-insured employer, the
employer has issued the required payment to the employee as part of the
next regular payroll after the payment becomes due."
New legislation permits employers or insurance carriers to
include chiropractors on the panel of physicians furnished to injured
employees. 69 This amendment further provides, however, that a
chiropractor is to be included only if the employees' injuries can be
treated within the chiropractor's scope of practice. 7 °
Virginia Code section 65.2-706(C) was amended to reflect that an
appeal from a decision of the Virginia Court of Appeals to the
Supreme Court of Virginia concerning a workers' compensation
award effectively suspends the award, and any payment thereon,
until the court determines the outcome of the appeal.'7 '
Additionally, new legislation authorizes employers subject to the
Virginia Workers' Compensation Act to voluntarily pay an employee
workers' compensation benefits "above and beyond those benefits
provided under the Act."' This amendment stipulates that such
payments are not to be treated as affecting or altering an existing
right or remedy of an employer or employee under the Virginia
Workers' Compensation Act.'73
Virginia Code section 65.2-302 was amended to exempt from
statutory employer liability:
any person who, at the time of an injury sustained by a worker engaged in
the maintenance or repair of real property managed by such person, and for
which injury compensation is sought:
166. See id. § 65.2-604(A) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
167. See id. (Repl. Vol. 1995).
168. Id. § 65.2-524 (Cure. Supp. 1999).
169. See id. § 65.2-603(F) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
170. See id.
171. See id. § 65.2-706(C) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
172. Id. § 65.2-307(B) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
173. See id.
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a. Was engaged in the business of property management on behalf of the
owner's of such property and was acting merely as an agent of the owner;
and
b. Did n ot engage in and had no employees engaged in the same trade,
business or occupation as the worker seeking compensation; and
c. Did not seek or oban... profit from the services performed by indlivid-
uals engaged in the same trade, business or occupation as the worker
seeking compensation.'
174. Id. § 65.2-302(D) (Curn. Supp. 1999).
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